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A Quantitative Analysis of the Used-Car Market
By Alessandro Gavazza, Alessandro Lizzeri and Nikita Roketskiy∗
We quantitatively investigate the allocative and welfare effects of
secondary markets for cars. An important source of gains from
trade in these markets is the heterogeneity in the willingness to
pay for higher-quality (newer) goods, but transaction costs are an
impediment to instantaneous trade. Calibration of the model suc-
cessfully matches several aggregate features of the U.S. and French
used-car markets. Counterfactual analyses show that transaction
costs have a large effect on volume of trade, allocations, and the
primary market. Aggregate effects on consumer surplus and wel-
fare are relatively small, but the effect on lower-valuation house-
holds can be large.
Secondary markets play an important allocative role for some durable goods.
For instance, in the U.S., the number of used-car transactions is approximately
three times as large as the number of new-car transactions. Furthermore, the
dispersion of used-car prices (measured by the coefficient of variation) is approx-
imately five times as large as the dispersion of new-car prices, suggesting that
secondary markets play an important role in broadening the spectrum of goods
available to consumers.1
The amount of activity in secondary markets varies dramatically across goods,
with some markets extremely active (e.g., cars, aircraft) and others much less so
(e.g., household appliances, computers). More surprisingly, the amount of activ-
ity also varies substantially across different countries for the same goods. For
instance, the American used-car market is much more active than the French
market. What forces are responsible for these differences? What are the conse-
quences for prices and allocations, for producers’ profits and consumers’ welfare?
How do these differences in activity affect the extent of variety available to con-
sumers? Can some of the observed differences in the primary markets across
goods and countries be due, in part, to the underlying causes of the differences
in activity in the secondary markets? These are some of the questions that this
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paper addresses.2
We present a simple model of durable-goods markets to tackle these issues.
As in all markets, activity in secondary markets arises because of some gains
from trade between counterparties. In the car market, an important source of
such gains from trade is heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for quality: high-
willingness-to-pay consumers sell used units when they upgrade to a new unit.3
Transaction costs are an impediment to instantaneous (i.e., 100 percent) trade.4
The extent of trade depends on the degree of heterogeneity in preferences. We
quantitatively investigate how the distribution of non-durable consumption con-
tributes to this heterogeneity by calibrating our model to match the aggregate
volume of trade in the used-car market. Despite its simplicity, the model fits the
data very well.
We then use the model to perform several counterfactuals, with the purpose
of understanding the functioning of secondary markets and their impact on the
market for new goods. First, we examine the effects of transaction costs by
comparing two polar cases with the baseline calibrated model: perfectly func-
tioning secondary markets with zero transaction costs and complete shutdown of
secondary markets with prohibitive transaction costs. Naturally, we expect any
changes in secondary markets to affect primary markets. Thus, the supply re-
sponse of new-goods producers is an important element determining the welfare
consequences of secondary markets’ frictions. We consider two extreme supply
scenarios that help highlight how primary markets adjust: 1) a perfectly elas-
tic supply—i.e., the price of new cars does not respond to changes in transaction
costs, but the quantity does; and 2) a perfectly inelastic supply—i.e., the quantity
of new cars does not respond to changes in transaction costs, but the price does.
We believe that these counterfactuals are useful to understand the importance
of transaction costs for manufacturers, since they indicate that either output or
prices change when transaction costs change, even in an oligopolistic market for
new cars.5
Three key economic forces affect allocations and welfare in our counterfactuals
with different transaction costs relative to the baseline case: 1) Higher (lower)
transaction costs have the partial-equilibrium direct effect of destroying (freeing)
resources, thereby affecting households’ willingness to pay because they obtain
different net resale prices; 2) lower (higher) transaction costs have the partial-
2Empirical studies of secondary markets include the following markets: cars (Porter and Sattler, 1999;
Adda and Cooper, 2000; Stolyarov, 2002; Esteban and Shum, 2007; Chen, Esteban and Shum, 2013; and
Schiraldi, 2011); truck tractors (Bond, 1983); commercial aircraft (Pulvino, 1998; Gavazza, 2011a and
2011b); business aircraft (Gilligan, 2004; Gavazza, 2013); and capital equipment (Eisfeldt and Rampini,
2009).
3There are, of course, other reasons for trade. For instance, the ideal car depends on household size,
so changes in the number of children may lead some households to trade in their sedan to purchase a
minivan. We could, in principle, add such characteristics to our model.
4Jovanovic (1998 and 2009) considers frictionless reassignment in a vintage model.
5Most of our analysis focuses on a single quality of new cars to simplify the way in which secondary
markets expand the array of goods available to consumers, but we also consider how the forces that we
discuss operate when new cars of different qualities are available (see Section IV.A).
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equilibrium indirect effect of allowing a finer (coarser) matching between house-
holds’ preferences and the quality of their cars; and 3) the two previous forces feed
into the general-equilibrium effects of changing new- and used-car prices and/or
quantities relative to the baseline case.
Overall, we find that the impact of transaction costs on allocations in both
the secondary market and in the market for new goods is large. In contrast, the
effects on aggregate welfare are small, although the distribution of these effects
is uneven, with low-valuation households suffering large losses from increases in
transaction costs. For instance, if transaction costs are large enough to shut down
secondary markets, the aggregate consumer-surplus loss equals two to six percent
of the aggregate baseline consumer surplus (in which transaction costs are cal-
ibrated to the data), depending on the elasticity of new-car supply. However,
some households with preferences below the median suffer surplus losses larger
than 50 percent of their baseline surplus. Aggregate welfare changes are smaller
because, due to heterogeneity, the highest-valuation households have dispropor-
tionate weights in the calculation of aggregate surplus. These households have
the smallest surplus loss when transaction costs increase because several margins
of adjustment allow them to reduce the effects of transaction costs—for example,
they can scrap their cars if resale is prohibitively expensive—and they do not
suffer much from the higher costs that accompany such adjustments. However,
since transaction costs lower the total quantity of cars by increasing scrappage,
low-preference households disproportionately suffer from this reduced availability
of cars.
These counterfactual analyses also reveal some additional intriguing findings.
For example, we find that either new-car output or new-car prices (depending on
whether new-car supply is elastic or inelastic) is non-monotonic in transaction
costs, with either output or prices going up relative to the baseline case. This
non-monotonicity is due to the different quantitative magnitudes of the key eco-
nomic forces for different levels of transaction costs. When transaction costs are
zero, frictionless secondary markets lead to much finer matching of qualities to
households’ valuations, thereby raising high-valuation households’ willingness to
pay for new cars. When supply is perfectly elastic (inelastic), the quantity (price)
of new cars produced must increase. When transaction costs are prohibitive, how-
ever, used-car markets shut down completely, so the only way for households to
upgrade quality is to scrap their used units. Indeed, scrappage increases substan-
tially, with cars lasting only two thirds as long as in the baseline scenario. This
increased scrappage feeds into a substantially higher demand for new cars and,
hence, higher output or price, depending on the elasticity of supply.
We further consider the allocative and welfare effects of a scrappage policy that
forces households to scrap their cars earlier than they otherwise would. Scrappage
policies have been introduced in a number of countries, and the policy that we
consider is closest to the Japanese shaken system of tough emission inspections
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that induces a particularly young fleet of cars in Japan.6 Specifically, we impose
that households have to scrap their cars when they reach the (approximate) scrap-
page age that keeps the total stock of cars equal to the stock in the counterfactual
with prohibitive transaction costs, so this choice facilitates the comparison be-
tween these counterfactuals. However, two substantive differences arise between
these two counterfactuals. First, secondary markets are active when there is a
scrappage policy, but they are not when transaction costs are prohibitive. Sec-
ond, households’ scrappage decisions are heterogeneous when transaction costs
are prohibitive, with higher-valuation households scrapping their cars substan-
tially earlier than lower-valuation households. However, this heterogeneity does
not arise under the scrappage policy since all cars have positive net resale values,
and, thus, no households scrap them before they reach the imposed scrappage
age.
We find that this scrappage policy has minor effects on aggregate welfare rel-
ative to the baseline case, especially in the case of elastic supply, although the
welfare losses are again large for low-valuation households. Moreover, we find
that welfare is higher with this scrappage policy than with prohibitive transac-
tion costs, further highlighting the welfare gains of resale markets. The reason
is that the first effect—i.e., active secondary markets—allows a finer matching of
relatively young vintages to high-valuation consumers, whereas the second effect—
i.e., heterogeneous scrappage—allows finer control of relatively low-quality cars
for low-valuation consumers. The first effect dominates because of supermodu-
larity: More value is created at the top of the quality distribution than is lost at
the bottom.
Finally, we explore the quantitative effects of heterogeneity by considering data
from another country, France. The distribution of non-durable consumption in
France is less dispersed than in the U.S., and the model predicts that we should
observe less trade in the French used-car market than in the U.S. market. Indeed,
this is also what the data say. The magnitude of the difference is also substantial:
The average holding time is approximately 30-percent longer in France than in
the U.S. Our model quantitatively matches French aggregate statistics fairly well.
Of course, there are many differences between the U.S. and France beyond the
differences in the distribution of non-durable consumption. However, it is notable
that the model can account for the differences in the aggregate car-market data
on which we focus. Another interesting consequence of lower heterogeneity is that
car prices are flatter in France than in the U.S., starting with a lower new-car
price and ending with higher used-car prices in France for the oldest vintages.
6As we explain in Section IV.B, our steady-state model is less well suited to an analysis of temporary
policies such as cash for clunkers. See Adda and Cooper (2000) for such an analysis that does not,
however, take into account the effects of secondary markets.
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I. Related Literature
This article contributes to two main strands of the literature. First, the theoret-
ical literature on consumer durable goods has investigated the role of secondary
markets in allocating new and used goods (Rust, 1985; Anderson and Ginsburgh,
1994; Waldman 1997, 2003; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a,b; Stolyarov, 2002). The
first part of our paper is close to Stolyarov (2002), which investigates resale rates
across different car vintages. We contribute to this strand of the literature by
providing a quantitative analysis of the allocative and welfare effects of secondary
markets, and by evaluating policies that affect secondary markets.
Second, a series of papers analyzes car markets. Many influential papers ana-
lyze product differentiation and consumers’ choices among new cars (Bresnahan,
1981; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Goldberg, 1995; Petrin, 2002) or man-
ufacturers’ pricing (Verboven, 1996; Goldberg and Verboven, 2001), but they do
not consider used goods and secondary markets. Wang (2008) incorporates the
durability of the good in consumers’ choice of new cars, and Schiraldi (2011)
considers new and used cars in consumers’ choice sets, but neither analyzes the
equilibrium in the market. Eberly (1994) and Attanasio (2000) study households’
adjustments of their vehicles’ stocks in partial-equilibrium. Hence, relative to all
these contributions, our equilibrium model is better suited to address the general-
equilibrium effects of heterogeneity and secondary markets and of policies, such
as scrappage policies, that impact durable-goods markets. The closest papers to
ours are Chen, Esteban and Shum (2013) and Yurko (2012). The main difference
with Chen, Esteban and Shum (2013) is that they focus on the effects of the sec-
ondary market on the primary market: They consider an oligopoly model with
forward-looking firms, and they compare the effects of secondary markets both
for the case of commitment and for the case in which manufacturers lack commit-
ment. Instead, our main focus is on the allocative and welfare role of secondary
markets: We consider a model with richer household heterogeneity and greater
vertical variety of used goods. Similarly, the contemporaneous paper by Yurko
(2012) investigates the role of heterogeneity in car markets, but does not consider
the allocative and welfare effects of secondary markets, as we do by performing
the counterfactual analyses in Section IV.7
II. Model
A. Assumptions
We modify a model of vertical product differentiation, which has become a
standard way to model secondary markets (see, for instance, Rust, 1985; An-
derson and Ginsburgh, 1994; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a and 1999b). Stolyarov
(2002) numerically solved such a model and obtained some interesting patterns
7Yurko’s (2012) model also assumes an exogenous functional form for prices, whereas we impose no
restrictions on prices.
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for secondary markets with transaction costs. We extend Stolyarov’s analysis to
incorporate some features that are important in the data, such as multiple cars
per household and the combination of exogenous and endogenous scrappage. We
then evaluate how this simple model can account for some aggregate features of
the data, while abstracting from some important features of car markets, such as
horizontal product differentiation.
The first step is to obtain the equilibrium in the car market for any given level
of new-car output. In every period, a constant (exogenous) flow x of new cars
enters the market. We will infer this output from the data and, as will become
clear, in our baseline model, it would be equivalent to assume that the unit cost
of cars is equal to p0 and that the car industry is perfectly competitive, so that
any quantity of new cars can be supplied at price p0.
8
New cars are homogeneous,9 with quality q0, and depreciate over time: A car
of age a is of quality qa, with qa > qa+1.
10 In each period, each car “dies” with
exogenous probability γ, independent of the age of the car; we interpret this ex-
ogenous “death” as the result of accidents or other events that induce households
to scrap their cars. All “surviving” cars are (endogenously) scrapped at time
T . For expositional simplicity, we describe the case in which, in equilibrium, all
agents choose to scrap at the same time T , as this is the relevant case for our
baseline calibration.11 The steady-state total mass of cars X is equal to
X =
T∑
t=0
x (1− γ)t = x
1− (1− γ)T+1
γ
.
A majority of U.S. households own more than one car (see Section III.A).
We need the model to capture this feature of the data for two reasons: first,
because, there are more cars than households, so assuming unit demand would
not be consistent with secondary-market activity (we discuss this in more detail
later); and, second, because we want to contrast the U.S. with France, where
the number of cars per household is lower. However, allowing households to hold
more than one car significantly complicates the numerical computation, so we do
not allow for more than two cars. Specifically, we assume that each household has
a preference parameter θ that determines the flow of utility that the household
enjoys from its cars. A household with preference θ and with two cars of vintages
8In our counterfactuals, we consider two scenarios for supply: 1) a perfectly elastic supply, as in
a perfectly competitive industry with constant marginal cost equal to p0; and 2) a perfectly inelastic
(per-period) supply equal to x.
9We consider heterogeneous vertical qualities of new goods in Section 5.1.2. Clearly, the car market
exhibits features that we abstract from, such as horizontal differentiation among car models, as in Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). However, the focus of our analysis is on the replacement patterns that
emerge from gains from trade due to vertical differentiation among different ages of a given car model.
10We can also interpret depreciation as the growing distance between older cars and the improving
technological frontier of new models (e.g., air bags, electronic stability control, etc.).
11Some of our counterfactuals require aggregation of heterogeneous scrappage decisions. This is a
straightforward extension that we omit from the main analysis to avoid cumbersome notation.
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a and b enjoys a per-period flow of utility equal to θmax{qa, qb}− c from its first
(better) car, and αθmin{qa, qb} − c from its second (worse) car. The parameter
α ∈ (0, 1) captures the lower valuation for the second car, and the parameter c is
a per-period holding (i.e., maintenance) cost, independent of car quality. The role
of the holding cost is to generate a reasonable scrappage age.12 The preference
parameter θ is distributed in the population according to the non-degenerate c.d.f.
F , whereas α is distributed in the population according to the non-degenerate
c.d.f. G. We assume that for each household θ and α are independent and do not
change over time.13
In order for the model to generate interesting implications for trade in the
secondary market, and to match relevant features of the data, we introduce some
frictions. We assume that there are transaction costs in the secondary market: If
a household sells a car of age a, it pays a transaction cost λa proportional to the
sale price.14 The level of transaction costs will be a key variable in some of our
counterfactuals.
B. Household problem
A household chooses how many cars to own and, for each car, which vintage to
buy and how long to keep it. Let Vθ,α(a, b) be the value function of a household
with preferences (θ, α) that, in the current period, is enjoying cars of vintage a
and b, respectively. Vθ,α(a, b) satisfies:
Vθ,α(a, b) = θmax{qa, qb}+ αθmin{qa, qb} − cI {a < T + 1} − cI {b < T + 1}
(1)
+ β (1− γ)2max
a′,b′
(
Vθ,α(a
′, b′)− pa′ + pa+1
(
1− λa+1I{a
′ 6= a+ 1}
)
−pb′ + pb+1
(
1− λb+1I{b
′ 6= b+ 1}
))
+ β (1− γ) γmax
a′,b′
(
Vθ,α(a
′, b′)− pa′ + pa+1
(
1− λa+1I{a
′ 6= a+ 1}
)
− pb′
)
+ β (1− γ) γmax
a′,b′
(
Vθ,α(a
′, b′)− pa′ − pb′ + pb+1
(
1− λb+1I{b
′ 6= b+ 1}
))
+ βγ2max
a′,b′
(
Vθ,α
(
a′, b′
)
− pa′ − pb′
)
,
where we let qx ≡ 0 and px ≡ 0 for x > T mean having no car, and β is the
discount factor common to all households.
12For scrappage decisions the only relevant holding costs are those for cars close to the scrappage age.
13We considered temporary shocks to preferences but in our computation these shocks were of negligible
importance for our calibration.
14The fact that transaction costs are paid by the sellers is immaterial: just like for taxation, equi-
librium allocations are invariant to the “statutory incidence” of transaction costs. Some dependence of
transaction costs on prices is realistic and allowing for a fixed component of transaction costs does not
change our qualitative and quantitative results. It is also possible to interpret the transaction cost as a
reduced form of adverse selection. This would give an additional reason why the percentage transaction
cost would rise with the vintage of the good since uncertainty over the quality of cars is likely to rise
with the age of the car.
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Equation (1) says that the household enjoys the current-period utility flows
θmax{qa, qb} − c and αθmin{qa, qb} − c from their youngest and oldest car, re-
spectively; recall that, if they own no car (car qT+1 in our notation), then this
flow utility is zero. In the next period, one of four possible events may happen to
a household:
1) With probability (1− γ)2 , all its cars are still “alive,” and the household
chooses between replacing any car or keeping it. If the household chooses to
replace the depreciated vintage-(a+ 1) car with a different vintage-a′ car,
it pays the price pa′ and receives the price pa+1 net of the transaction costs
λa+1pa+1. If the household chooses not to replace the car, it enjoys a car of
vintage a′ = a+ 1, thereby avoiding any transaction costs.
2) With probability (1− γ) γ, the household exogenously scraps its vintage-b
car. It then chooses which vintage b′ to acquire to replace the scrapped car
and chooses whether to replace the depreciated vintage-(a+ 1) car with a
different vintage-a′ car.
3) With probability (1− γ) γ, the household exogenously scraps its vintage-a
car. It then chooses which vintage a′ to acquire to replace the scrapped car
and chooses whether to replace the depreciated vintage-(b+ 1) car with a
different vintage-b′ car.
4) With probability γ2, the household exogenously scraps both its cars and
then chooses which vintages a′ and b′ to purchase, if any.
At the beginning of each period, given preferences (θ, α) and currently-owned
vintages a and b, households choose policies a∗ (θ, α, a, b) and b∗ (θ, α, a, b) to
maximize
Vθ,α(a
′, b′)− pa′ + pa
(
1− λaI{a
′ 6= a}
)
− pb′ + pb
(
1− λbI{b
′ 6= b}
)
.
Moreover, the endogenous scrappage age T is determined by the following condi-
tions: i) No household chooses to keep a car of quality qT ; ii) no household buys
a car of quality qT ; and iii) a car of quality qT has a price pT equal to zero.
Let h (a, b|θ, α) be the stationary distribution of holdings of cars of vintages a
and b, respectively, for a household with preferences θ and α. This distribution
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h (a, b|θ, α) is constructed recursively as:
h
(
a′, b′|θ, α
)
=
T+1∑
a=0
T+1∑
b=0
(1− γ)2 I{a∗ (θ, α, a+ 1, b+ 1) = a′, b∗ (θ, α, a+ 1, b+ 1) = b′}h (a, b|θ, α) +
T+1∑
a=0
T+1∑
b=0
(1− γ) γI{a∗ (θ, α, a+ 1, T + 1) = a′, b∗ (θ, α, a+ 1, T + 1) = b′}h (a, b|θ, α) +
T+1∑
a=0
T+1∑
b=0
(1− γ) γI{a∗ (θ, α, T + 1, b+ 1) = a′, b∗ (θ, α, T + 1, b+ 1) = b′}h (a, b|θ, α) +
T+1∑
a=0
T+1∑
b=0
γ2I{a∗ (θ, α, T + 1, T + 1) = a′, b∗ (θ, α, T + 1, T + 1) = b′}h (a, b|θ, α) .(2)
Equation (2) says that a household with preferences θ and α and cars of vintages
a and b faces the random exogenous scrappage of their cars. With probability
(1− γ)2, these cars do not “die” but are one year older, and the household chooses
which vintages a′ and b′ to drive in the current period. Similarly, with probability
(1− γ) γ, one car dies—thereby becoming a car of vintage T + 1—and the other
car is one year older. The other events have similar explanations.
Integrating over households’ preferences yields the stationary distributionQ (a′, b′)
over holdings of cars of vintages a′ and b′:
(3) Q
(
a′, b′
)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
h
(
a′, b′|θ, α
)
dF (θ)dG (α) .
Market equilibrium is defined by standard competitive conditions. Specifically,
an equilibrium is a vector of households’ policies a∗ (θ, α, a, b) and b∗ (θ, α, a, b)
and a vector of prices p = (p0, .., pT−1) such that: (i) decision rules are optimal,
and (ii) for every vintage t, households’ car holdings
∑T
b=0Q (t, b)+
∑T
a=0Q (a, t)
equal the stock x (1− γ)t of this vintage.
III. Calibration
A. Data
We use data from the 2000 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), a cross-
sectional survey of 7,860 U.S. households. The CEX reports detailed information
about households’ vehicles at the time of the interview, such as the model; the
age; whether it is owned or leased; whether it was acquired in the last 12 months;
whether it was acquired new or used; and the price paid.15 The CEX also re-
15The CEX also reports some information on cars provided by the employers (company cars), but
this information is less detailed than information about personal cars. In addition, in some cases, the
decision to replace a company car may not be in the hands of the household. For these reasons, we
exclude company cars from our analysis, but it is possible that some households use their cars for
business purposes.
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Table 1—: Secondary Market for Cars, U.S.
Households with at least one car
Households that acquired a car in the last 12 months
3.09
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
4.54
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
3.55
Correlation(log(Non-Durables), Age of Young Car) −0.30
Households with no car 0.13
Households with one car 0.34
Households with more than one car 0.53
Note: This table provides aggregate statistics of the U.S. car market computed from the 2000 Consumer
Expenditure Survey.
ports households’ income and consumption for different categories of goods. We
aggregate consumption goods to construct households’ non-durable consumption
following Krueger and Perri (2006), and we will use it to capture households’
willingness to pay for car quality in our quantitative analysis.
Table 1 reports some aggregate statistics on households’ car holdings, computed
from the CEX. The quantitative analysis of our model will aim to match these
moments. Specifically, the first row reports that, on average, one in every three
U.S. households acquired a car in the 12 months prior to the survey interview.
The second row reports that one in every 4.5 cars was purchased within the last
12 months. The third row reports that, of all cars traded, approximately one
in every four cars was new. Overall, these patterns indicate that secondary car
markets are very active. The fourth row reports that, on aggregate, households’
non-durable consumption predicts households’ car holdings, but heterogeneity in
households’ preferences plays an important role in determining their car holdings.
The last three rows report the fraction of households with zero, one and more than
one car, respectively. The majority of U.S. households hold more than one car.16
B. Choice of Parameters
We calibrate the model to investigate whether it can quantitatively replicate
the aggregate statistics for the U.S. markets reported in Table 1. Most parame-
ters are taken directly from the data, while some are calibrated to match some
important features of the CEX data. We report in Table 2 the numerical val-
ues of the parameters that we use in our calibration, and we describe below how
we choose these numerical values, thereby providing intuitive arguments on the
“identification” of these parameters.
16More precisely, 33 percent of households hold two cars; 13.4 percent of households hold three cars;
4.4 percent of household hold four cars; 1.4 percent of households hold five cars; and 0.65 percent of
households hold six or more cars. Our model pools all these households into households with two cars.
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Table 2—: Calibration Parameters
Parameter β µy σy µǫ σǫ E (α) St.Dev. (α)
Value 0.95 9.49 0.63 0 1.16 0.2362 0.0748
Parameter X x γ T c δ q0 λa
Value 1.40 0.0869 0.02 20 1, 350 0.0236 0.78 0.15 - 0.50
Note: This table provides the numerical values of the parameters used in the calibration.
We assume that one period equals one year, and we set the discount rate β =
.95.
One important input into our quantitative analysis is the distribution F of the
marginal valuation for quality θ, which is not directly observable. The following
theoretical argument is one way to understand our choice of the empirical coun-
terpart of θ. It is natural to think that θ is (inversely) related to the marginal
utility of the outside good (non-durable consumption in our setting, see Tirole,
1988, chapter 2). If we assume that households have logarithmic utilities, then
this inverse marginal utility is equal to non durable consumption. We also allow
for an idiosyncratic component in the valuation for quality. Guided in part by
this reasoning, we let θ = yǫ, where y is household non-durable consumption and
ǫ is a parameter that is a household-specific preference component uncorrelated
with y.17 Using the CEX, we find that a lognormal distribution with parameters
µy = 9.49 and σy = 0.63 fits the distribution of non-durable consumption almost
perfectly. We further let ǫ have a lognormal distribution, imposing µǫ = 0 (this is
just a normalization) and calibrating the parameter σǫ. The parameter σǫ affects
several statistics in the calibration, but the correlation between the log of house-
holds’ non-durable consumption and the age of their youngest car is particularly
informative about this parameter σǫ. The calibrated value is σǫ = 1.16.
We let the distribution G of α be a Beta distribution. We calibrate the two
parameters of the Beta distribution to match the aggregate statistics reported
in Table 1. We obtain the best fit of the data with a mean α equal to 0.2362
and a standard deviation of α equal to 0.0748. The key statistic that pins down
the mean value of α is the number of cars per household, whereas the standard
deviation of α has a broader effect on all statistics.
We set the total stock of cars X = 1.40 to match the sum of the fraction of
households with one car plus twice the fraction of households with more than one
car. We obtain the empirical analog of the ratio of the stock to the flow X/x in
17Most previous empirical papers (see Section I) on the auto market show that several observable
households’ characteristics (income, household size, age etc.) affect car choices. In the Online Appendix,
we show how our framework allows us to capture households’ heterogeneity in a similar way to those
related papers.
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the model from the product of the ratios
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired last 12 months
and
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
reported in Table 1. This operation yields X/x = 16.11, thus implying that
the value of x equals 0.0869. We set the “exogenous scrappage” γ = 0.02 by
calculating in the CEX the average fraction of vintage-a to vintage-(a+ 1) cars
for all cars less than 15 years old.18 Furthermore, from the equality of the total
stock of cars X = x
(
1− (1− γ)T+1
)
/γ, we obtain an endogenous scrappage age
T = 20.19
We set c = $1, 350 by computing the per-car annual average expenditure on car
maintenance, insurance and gasoline in the CEX.20 We then set qT to match the
scrappage age T = 20 corresponding to this value of c, given that the marginal
consumer of this car must receive zero flow utility. We further let qa = (1− δ)
a q0,
with a value of δ = 0.0236 to match the average annual depreciation of car prices
of around 20 percent. We then choose q0 = 0.78 to match the average price of
$22,000 of a new-car purchase reported in the CEX.
To calculate transaction costs λa, we use price data obtained from the Kelley
Blue Book for some of the most popular cars in the U.S.: Toyota Corolla, Toyota
Camry, and Toyota Previa/Sienna. As in Porter and Sattler (1999), we estimate
transaction costs using the difference between suggested retail and trade-in values.
These values increase from approximately 15 percent for one-year-old cars to more
than 50 percent for cars more than ten years old.21 We then fit a quadratic
polynomial regression in age to these data on transaction costs to smooth them
and average them across different cars.22
18The exogenous scrappage rate γ = 0.02 is lower than in Cohen and Greenspan (1999) for the years
1970-1996. This is consistent with the persistent improvement in car durability and reliability over time
that Cohen and Greenspan already observed in their sample period.
19The scrappage rate of cars older than 15 years increases substantially in the CEX. We view our
choices of scrappage rates for cars of age a < T and of age T as reasonable approximations of a
scrappage process that increases more gradually over the age of the car.
20This number is stable across vintages, so we use a constant number to simplify computations.
21Transaction costs are increasing in the age of the car in percentage terms. However, because car
prices are declining in the age of the car, the dollar value of transaction costs is non-monotonic in the
age of the car, declining for cars older than three years.
22Our estimates of transaction costs do not take into account that transaction costs may be hetero-
geneous across households. Specifically, for individuals who choose to transact with dealers, the bid-ask
spread is a lower bound on their transaction costs. Instead, for households that choose to transact with
private parties, the bid-ask spread is likely an upper bound on their transaction costs. Unfortunately,
allowing for heterogeneous transaction costs is computationally burdensome.
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C. Computational Algorithm
For each value of the parameters, we take N = 1, 500 draws θi and αi, i =
1, ..., N from their distributions F and G, and we compute the equilibrium using
the following steps:
1) We start with a vector of prices p = (p0, .., pT−1) .
2) For each household (θ, α) , we calculate optimal policies a′ (θ, α, a, b) and
b′ (θ, α, a, b).
3) We calculate the stationary distribution h (a, b|θ, α).
4) We calculate the stationary distributionQ (a, b) of age a as
∑N
i=1 h (a, b|θi, αi) .
5) We search for the vector of prices p that minimizes the excess demand of all
vintages. More formally, we search for the vector of prices p that minimizes
the largest absolute value of excess demand across all vintages:23
min
p
max
t∈{0,...,T}
{∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
b=0
Q (t, b) +
T∑
a=0
Q (a, t)− x (1− γ)t
∣∣∣∣∣
}
.
We choose the parameters that minimize the maximum absolute value of the
percentage differences between the empirical and the theoretical moments re-
ported in Table 1 (of course, the last line is redundant, so the objective function
does not include it).
D. Results
Table 3 reports the numerical results of the calibration of our model, along
with the observed values in the data. (In the analysis in the following sections,
we refer to the results of Table 3 as the “baseline case.”) The model is a quanti-
tative success, as it matches the aggregate features of the U.S. car market well.
This suggests that, for the purposes of understanding aggregate features of the
allocative role of secondary markets, our simple model of vertical differentiation
with transaction costs captures key aspects of the gains from trade in the used-car
market.
We now discuss in more detail some key outcomes of the calibrated model.
Trade.
The model closely matches the statistics on aggregate trade in cars and activity
in secondary markets, most notably the fraction of households acquiring a car and
the fraction of cars traded, although it slightly underpredicts them (by less than
ten percent, at most).
23We stop searching for prices when this absolute value is less than 1
N
.
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Table 3—: Secondary Markets: Model vs. Data
Data Model
Households with at least one car
Households that acquired a car in the last 12 months
3.09 3.21
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
4.54 5.08
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
3.55 3.27
Correlation(log(Non-Durables), Age of Young Car) −0.30 −0.23
Households with no car 0.13 0.13
Households with one car 0.34 0.35
Households with more than one car 0.53 0.52
Note: This table reports the moments of the data that the model seeks to match and the corresponding
moments computed from the model with the parameters reported in Table 1.
Household Car Holdings.
Table 3 shows that the model matches the fraction of households with no car,
one car, and more than one car very well. The parameter that allows the model to
match these statistics is α, the ratio between the preference for the second and for
the first car. Moreover, the model matches the correlation between households’
non-durable consumption and the of age of their youngest car reasonably well.
The unobserved heterogeneity parameter ǫ governs this correlation.
Car Prices.
The fast decline of equilibrium prices—approximately 20 percent per year—is
the joint outcome of cars’ physical depreciation (captured by the parameters γ, δ
and T ) and the equilibrium sorting of consumers across vintages. The reason for
this large price decline is that the U.S. distribution of preferences displays wide
dispersion, and, thus, the willingness to pay for a marginally better car is high.
In Section V, we will see that in France, where the dispersion of the distribution
of preferences is lower, the price decline is not as steep.
IV. Counterfactual Analyses
We now perform several counterfactuals. Specifically, we analyze the effects of
transaction costs by considering two extreme cases: frictionless secondary markets
and complete shutdown of secondary markets. By changing the frictions in the
secondary market relative to our calibrated baseline, these counterfactuals can
help us gain some quantitative insights into the allocative and welfare effects of
secondary markets. We then consider the case of scrappage policies that eliminate
the availability of older cars.
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Naturally, we expect any changes in secondary markets to affect primary mar-
kets. Thus, the supply response of new-goods producers is an important element
determining the welfare consequences of secondary markets’ frictions. We con-
sider two alternative scenarios that help highlight how primary markets adjust.
First, we consider the case of perfectly elastic supply—i.e., the price of new cars
does not respond to changes in transaction costs, but the quantity does. Second,
we consider the case of perfectly inelastic supply—i.e., the quantity of new cars
does not respond to changes in transaction costs, but the price does. These two
cases can be interpreted as two extremes—a perfectly competitive industry with
constant marginal costs of production versus an industry with binding capacity
constraints for all producers. We wish to emphasize that our counterfactuals do
not include some additional long-run effects, such as the change in the durability
of cars; see the Conclusions for additional discussions. Nonetheless, we believe
that these counterfactuals are useful for understanding the importance of trans-
action costs for manufacturers since they indicate that either output or prices
change when transaction costs change, even in a oligopolistic market for new cars.
In our analysis, we compare consumer surplus across the different counterfac-
tuals by averaging the value functions Vθ,α (a, b) over the stationary distribution
h (a, b|θ, α):
T+1∑
a=0
T+1∑
b=0
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
Vθ,α (a, b) h (a, b|θ, α) dF (θ) dG (α) .
Moreover, we calculate producers’ per-capita flow profits as (p0 −mc)x. In the
case of a perfectly elastic supply, profits are zero. In the case of an inelastic
supply, we impute the marginal cost mc to be equal to the baseline new-car price
p0. Hence, producers’ profits are zero in the baseline case, whereas they are equal
to (p′0 − p0) x in counterfactual scenarios, where p
′
0 is the counterfactual new-car
price.
The differences in allocations and welfare between our counterfactuals and the
baseline case are largely due to three economic effects that we will discuss in more
detail for each case.
1) Increasing (decreasing) transaction costs has the partial-equilibrium direct
effect of destroying (freeing) resources, thereby affecting households’ will-
ingness to pay because they obtain different net resale prices.
2) Lower (higher) transaction costs have the partial-equilibrium indirect effect
of allowing a finer (coarser) matching between households’ preferences and
the quality of their cars.
3) Effects (1) and (2) feed into the general-equilibrium effects of changing new-
and used-car prices and/or quantities relative to the baseline case.
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A. The Effects of Transaction Costs
In this section, we consider the allocative and welfare effects of transaction costs.
This is the natural starting point to study the importance of secondary markets.
In our quantitative analysis in Section III, we used transaction costs proportional
to prices, calculated by fitting dealer bid-ask spreads. We now consider two
extreme counterfactual scenarios: frictionless secondary markets and complete
shutdown of secondary markets. These cases correspond to λa = 0 and λa = 1
for all a, respectively.
Frictionless Resale Markets
When transaction costs are zero—i.e., λa = 0 for all a—the households’ max-
imization problem is equivalent to a static one. Households hold the same car
vintage/quality over time by trading in their depreciated units every period. Of
course, households differ in the vintage they hold. The equilibrium displays per-
fect matching between households’ preferences (either θ or αθ) and the qualities
of the cars chosen in every period. Market clearing requires that either:
1) All households have at least one car, and the highest-valuation households
own two cars. In this case, there is a threshold value (αθ)′ that satisfies
X = 1 + 1−M
(
(αθ)′
)
= 2−M
(
(αθ)′
)
, where households’ preferences αθ
have c.d.f. M (z) =
∫ z
0 m (x) dx and p.d.f. m (x) =
∫ +∞
0 g (x/θ) f (θ)
1
θ
dθ.
Hence, all households own one car (the term 1), and all households with
valuation above (αθ)′ own two cars (the term 1−M
(
(αθ)′
)
); or
2) there are households with zero, one, and two cars. In this case, there are
thresholds θ′′ and (αθ)′′′ that satisfy X = 1 − F (θ′′) + 1 −M
(
(αθ)′′′
)
and
θ′′ = (αθ)′′′. Hence, all households with valuation above θ′′ own one car
(the term 1 − F (θ′′)), all households with valuation above (αθ)′′′ own two
cars (the term 1 −M
(
(αθ)′′′
)
), and the lowest willingness-to-pay of one-
and two-car households is the same.
Case 2 is the empirically relevant one, as 13 percent of households have no cars.
Table 4 reports the quantitative results for the scenario of zero transaction costs
for the case of a perfectly elastic supply of new cars—i.e., the price p0 of new cars
is the same as in our baseline case in Section III—and for the case of a perfectly
inelastic supply of new cars—i.e., the quantity x of new cars is the same as in the
baseline case in Section III. Overall, the quantitative effects are similar in these
two supply scenarios.
Quantity of cars.
Table 4 reports that new-car output increases in the case of elastic supply
relative to the baseline case. The reason is that the reduction in transaction
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Table 4—: Allocative and Welfare Effects of Secondary Markets, No Transaction
Costs
Baseline
Elastic
Supply
Inelastic
Supply
New Cars
New Cars, Baseline Case
1 1.05 1
Price of a New Car
Price of a New Car, Baseline Case
1 1 1.074
Households with at least one car
Households that acquired a car in the last 12 months
3.21 1 1
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
5.08 1 1
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
3.27 16.64 16.64
Correlation(log(Non-Durables), Age of Young Car) −0.23 −0.25 −0.23
Households with no cars 0.13 0.13 0.13
Households with one car 0.35 0.35 0.35
Households with two cars 0.52 0.52 0.52
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
1 1.016 1.008
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
1 1.024 1.008
Median
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
1 1.026 1.010
Welfare
Welfare, Baseline case
1 1.016 1.015
Transaction Costs
Consumer Surplus
0.008 0 0
Note: This table reports statistics on allocations and welfare computed from the model with no
transaction costs (i.e., λa = 0) and with an elastic or inelastic supply of new cars, respectively.
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
andMedian
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
are
computed using only households with cars in the baseline case.
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costs and the finer matching of qualities to households’ valuations combine to
raise high-valuation households’ willingness to pay. Since prices are kept at the
same level by the adjustment of (perfectly elastic) supply, the number of new cars
demanded increases. In contrast, by definition, new-car output is unchanged in
the case of inelastic supply.
When new-car supply is elastic, the scrappage age decreases slightly relative to
the baseline case. The reason is as follows. If the scrappage age did not decrease,
the increase in the supply of new cars would lead to an increase in the total stock
of cars. Hence, the marginal owner of a car would have a lower valuation (either
θ or αθ) than in the baseline case. However, taking into account that the holding
cost c is such that the marginal owner for the baseline case has zero utility, the
reduction in marginal valuation implies that the marginal owner’s net utility flow
in the new scenario has to be negative, which is a contradiction. The reduction
in scrappage age implies that some low-valuation consumers scrap their cars at
the earlier age of T = 19 rather than at T = 20.
In contrast, when new-car supply is inelastic, the endogenous scrappage age
is the same as in the baseline case—i.e., T = 20. The reason is that the total
stock of cars does not change, and, therefore, the optimal scrapping age does not
change either since net prices (i.e., net of transaction costs) are positive in both
cases. Overall, the total stock of cars is the same in both supply scenarios as in
the baseline case.
Prices.
New-car prices are obviously unchanged when the supply of new cars is elastic,
whereas they increase when the supply of new cars is inelastic. This increase is
the mirror image of the increase in output discussed above for the case of elastic
supply. First, the absence of transaction costs allows higher-valuation households
to capture the full resale value of cars, thereby increasing their willingness to
pay. Second, the absence of transaction costs allows a finer matching between
household preferences and cars. In particular, higher-valuation households own
better cars, thereby increasing their willingness to pay.
Interestingly, in both new-car supply scenarios, prices of older cars (i.e., older
than the average car) decline relative to the baseline case—on average, by ap-
proximately 13 percent when supply is elastic and by approximately two percent
when supply is inelastic. The intuition for the decrease is consistent with the new-
car price increase and arises from the balancing of two contrasting effects. First,
as cars age, the expected number of future trades is smaller. Hence, while the
elimination of transaction costs raises households’ willingness to pay, this effect is
smaller for older goods than for newer goods. Second, the finer matching allowed
by frictionless trade implies that, relative to the baseline case, lower-valuation
households own older cars. Overall, the second negative effect dominates the first
positive (but small) one for older goods, thereby depressing their prices. When
the supply of cars is elastic, there is an additional effect coming from the higher
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new-car output. Since only some of the oldest cars are scrapped when transac-
tion costs are zero, the stock of cars of all vintages a < T is higher, too. Thus,
since the equilibrium displays perfect matching between households’ preferences
and the quality of their cars, the valuation (either θ or αθ) of the owner of each
vintage a < T has to drop to equate supply and demand.
Trade.
The effect of removing transaction costs on the volume of trade is dramatic,
but perhaps unsurprising. When transaction costs are zero, all cars trade in every
period, so the volume of trade is equal to 100 percent. This explains the third
and fourth rows of Table 4. While cars are endogenously scrapped at T = 20, the
exogenous scrappage γ implies that the ratio of the stock of cars to the flow of
new cars equals 16.64, lower than T. This explains the fifth row of Table 4.
Household Car Holdings.
The distribution of the number of cars per household is exactly the same in the
counterfactual scenarios as in the baseline case. This holds in our model as long
as there is trade in the oldest vintage. To understand the reason for this feature,
note that the price of the oldest vintage must be zero because the identity of the
last vintage is determined by the lowest-valuation used-car owner’s indifference
between owning a car of that vintage or scrapping it—thus not owning any car
and enjoying a utility flow of zero. Hence, the scrappage age is determined by
the equality of the utility flow for the last vintage (either θ′′qT or αθ
′′′qT ) and the
holding cost c of the lowest-valuation used-car owner (either θ′′ or αθ′′′). Since
the utility flow is higher with younger vintages, the previous arguments imply
that to figure out whether a household with valuation θ owns a car, it is enough
to determine if its utility flow for the last vintage (either θqT or αθqT ) exceeds
the holding cost c. Since the total stock of cars is the same in the counterfactual
scenarios as in the baseline scenarios, it must also be the case that the marginal
θ (and αθ) that owns a unit is the same, implying that the distribution of cars
per household is also the same.
Removing transaction costs increases the absolute value of the correlation be-
tween (the log of) households’ non-durable consumption and the age of their
youngest car, as displayed in the sixth row of Table 4. The magnitude of this
increase is small, suggesting that transaction costs have little effect on the sorting
between cars and households in the baseline case.
Welfare.
The three economic effects of removing transaction costs discussed above—i.e.,
the direct effect of freeing resources, the indirect effect of allowing a finer matching
between preferences and vintages, and the general-equilibrium effect on prices—
have a contrasting impact on consumer surplus and on overall welfare relative
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to the baseline case. Specifically, when there are no transaction costs, the first
two effects increase consumer surplus and welfare relative to the baseline case.
However, the general-equilibrium effect on prices—lower on old cars and higher on
new cars when the supply is inelastic—has a heterogeneous impact on individual
households’ surplus, depending on their preferences, and a negative impact on
aggregate consumer surplus; but the general-equilibrium effect a positive impact
on producers’ profits when supply is inelastic.
Figure 1 displays the ratio between consumer surplus in the counterfactual case
of zero transaction costs and in the baseline case for all households that acquire a
car, ranked by the percentile of their preference θ, for the two scenarios of elastic
and inelastic supply. Overall, Figure 1 shows that, for almost all households,
surplus is higher when transaction costs are zero, indicating that the first two
effects dominate. Interestingly, the ratios are non-monotonic in θ. Households
at the bottom of the distribution are marginal car consumers—i.e., they own the
worst cars. Prices of these cars adjust to any change in transaction costs to leave
surplus close to zero. Inframarginal households receive a positive surplus gain
because price adjustment cannot fully extract the surplus change. However, while
these gains are monotonic in the preference θ, they have a vanishing percentage
effect on the welfare of the highest-preference households. Overall, the average
and median percentage surplus gains from having frictionless resale markets equal
0.8 to 2.4 and one to 2.6 percent of the baseline surplus, respectively, depending
on the elasticity of the new-car supply.
Table 4 reports that, when secondary markets are frictionless, total consumer
surplus increases by 1.5 percent or 0.8 percent relative to the baseline case, de-
pending on the elasticity of new-car supply. These correspond to $383 or $217 per
year for households with at least one car. Table 4 further reports that the increase
in aggregate consumer surplus is smaller than the increase for most households
(as displayed in Figure 1); this is because the highest-valuation households have
disproportionate weights in the calculation of aggregate consumer surplus due
to the large preference inequality in the U.S., and these households receive the
smallest gains.
When supply is elastic, producers’ profits are zero, and, thus, overall welfare
increases by the same amount as consumer surplus—i.e., by 1.5 percent. When
supply is inelastic, producers’ profits increase relative to the baseline case since
new-car prices are higher. Overall, removing transaction costs increases welfare
by 1.47 percent in the case of inelastic new-car supply, as well. More than half of
this increase is due to the increase in consumer surplus.
The magnitudes reported in Table 4 allow us to quantify the three economic
effects of removing transaction costs. The last row of Table 4 reports that the
direct effect of transaction costs equals 0.8 percent of consumer surplus in the
baseline case. Since the total effect of removing transaction costs on consumer
surplus when new-car supply is elastic equals 1.5 percent of consumer surplus, the
indirect effect—through a finer matching between preferences and vintages—is of
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Figure 1. : The figure displays counterfactual consumer surplus with no transac-
tion costs relative to baseline consumer surplus by percentile of valuation θ, elastic
new-car supply (dashed line) and inelastic new-car supply (solid line). Consumer
surplus is calculated as the average value function before purchasing any car:∫ 1
0 Vθ,α (T + 1, T + 1) dG (α).
the same order of magnitude as the direct effect of transaction costs. Instead, the
difference between aggregate welfare and consumer surplus when new-car supply
is inelastic suggests that the general-equilibrium effect on new-car prices—or,
alternatively, supply distortions—is quite small in this case.
No Resale Markets
When transaction costs are prohibitive (i.e., λa = 1 for all a), households
purchase only new cars, and their key choice is how long to keep them before
scrapping and replacing them. In equilibrium, each household has an optimal
scrappage age T (θ) , with households with higher valuation θ scrapping their
cars earlier, thereby holding, on average, younger vintages.
Table 5 reports the quantitative results with counterfactual prohibitive trans-
action costs for the case of a perfectly elastic supply of new cars—i.e., the price
p0 of new cars is the same as in our baseline case in Section III—and for the case
of a perfectly inelastic supply of new cars—i.e., the quantity x of new cars is the
same as in the baseline case in Section III. Overall, as in the previous analysis
of no transaction costs, the overall aggregate welfare effects are mostly similar in
the two supply scenarios.
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Table 5—: Allocative and Welfare Effects of Secondary Markets, Prohibitive
Transaction Costs
Baseline
Elastic
Supply
Inelastic
Supply
New Cars
New Cars, Baseline Case
1 1.23 1
Price of a New Car
Price of a New Car, Baseline Case
1 1 1.41
Households with at least one car
Households that acquired a car in the last 12 months
3.21 7.05 7.95
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
5.08 11.36 12.58
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
3.27 1 1
Correlation(log(Non-Durables), Age of Young Car) −0.23 −0.14 −0.15
Households with no cars 0.13 0.27 0.32
Households with one car 0.35 0.28 0.28
Households with two cars 0.52 0.45 0.40
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
1 0.98 0.94
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
1 0.71 0.61
Median
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
1 0.91 0.79
Welfare
Welfare, Baseline case
1 0.98 0.97
Transaction Costs
Consumer Surplus
0.008 N.A. N.A.
Note: This table reports statistics on allocations and welfare computed from the model with pro-
hibitive transaction costs (i.e., λa = 1) and with an elastic or inelastic supply of new cars, respectively.
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
andMedian
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
are
computed using only households with cars in the baseline case.
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Quantity of cars.
Table 5 reports that, when new-car supply is elastic, new-car output increases
by 23 percent relative to the baseline case. Note that this implies that output
is non-monotonic in transaction costs since Table 4 shows that new-car output
is also larger when there are no transaction costs relative to the baseline case.
However, different forces affect output in the two extreme counterfactual scenar-
ios. The reason for the large increase when transaction costs are prohibitive is
that scrappage increases substantially. This occurs because the secondary-market
shutdown implies that the only way for households to upgrade their quality is to
scrap their current cars. From the numbers reported in Table 5, it can be verified
that, on average, scrappage occurs at approximately T = 14 in the case of inelas-
tic supply and at approximately T = 13 in the case of elastic supply, as compared
to T = 20 in the baseline case. Thus, the comparison between the elastic and
inelastic cases indicates that, on average, households scrap cars slightly earlier
in the case of elastic supply. The reason is that, with inelastic supply, new-car
output does not increase to partially compensate for earlier scrappage, leading
to a higher new-car price and dampening the incentive to scrap early. Overall,
the total stock of cars decreases substantially relative to the baseline case—in
particular, in the case of inelastic supply.
Prices.
Table 5 reports that, when new-car supply is inelastic, new-car prices increase
by 41 percent relative to the baseline case. This is a mirror image of the increase
in output in the case of a perfectly elastic supply: prices of new cars increase
relative to the baseline case because the demand for new cars increases. Since
households scrap their cars earlier than in the baseline case, the demand for new
cars increases, and so does their price.
Trade.
The effect of prohibitive transaction costs on the volume of trade is, again,
unsurprising. When transaction costs are prohibitive, the volume of trade in used
cars is zero. This, along with the change in the stock of cars, explains the fourth
and fifth rows.
Household Car Holdings.
Overall, the inability to resell cars reduces the stock of cars relative to the base-
line case. Thus, the fraction of households with no cars increases, and the fraction
of households with two cars decreases relative to the baseline case. However, a
natural question arises: Since transaction costs are prohibitive, why do some
households choose to have only one car—i.e., why do they scrap a car rather than
keeping it as a second car? Clearly, at scrappage time, the car satisfies θq−c ≥ 0,
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Figure 2. : The figure displays counterfactual consumer surplus with prohibitive
transaction costs relative to baseline consumer surplus by percentile of valuation
θ, elastic new-car supply (dashed line) and inelastic new-car supply (solid line).
Consumer surplus is calculated as the average value function before purchasing
any car:
∫ 1
0 Vθ,α (T + 1, T + 1) dG (α).
and for most households this inequality holds strictly. However, households keep
their first cars until they are quite old; therefore, these cars are, on average, of
low quality, implying that a typical case involves αθq − c < 0. Therefore, it is
better to scrap relatively old cars than to keep them as second cars, even though
they would give positive utility flows if held as first cars.
Moreover, prohibitive transaction costs decrease the absolute value of the cor-
relation between (the log of) households’ non-durable consumption and the age of
their youngest car, as reported in the sixth row of Table 5. The magnitude of this
decrease is sizable, suggesting that the inability to resell cars has a non-trivial
effect on the sorting between cars and households and, thus, on their surplus.
Welfare.
Figure 2 displays the ratio between consumer surplus with prohibitive trans-
action costs and consumer surplus in the baseline case for all households that
acquire a car in the baseline case, ranked by the percentile of their valuation θ,
for the two scenarios of elastic and inelastic supply. The figure confirms that
surplus is higher for all households when new-car supply is more elastic. The fig-
ure also shows that households at the bottom of the valuation distribution suffer
the largest surplus loss relative to the baseline case because the lower stock of
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cars implies that these households do not own a car. Indeed, the surplus losses
are quite dramatic for households with valuation below the median of the distri-
bution: The average and the median percentage losses equal 29-39 percent and
9-21 percent of the baseline surplus, respectively, depending on the elasticity of
the new-car supply. Overall, Table 5 reports that, relative to the baseline case,
aggregate consumer surplus drops by two percent when supply is elastic and by
six percent when supply is inelastic, corresponding to $505 or $1,513 per year, re-
spectively, for households with cars in the baseline case. Table 5 reports that the
drop in aggregate consumer surplus is smaller than the drop for most households
because the highest-preference households have disproportionate weights in the
calculation of aggregate surplus. Figure 2 shows that these households have the
smallest surplus loss.
When new-car supply is inelastic, producers’ profits increase substantially since
new-car prices increase by 41 percent, as indicated in the first row of Table 5.
Overall, the decrease of consumer welfare due to higher new-car prices is approx-
imately equivalent to the increase in producer profits. Thus, the magnitude of
the aggregate decrease in welfare due to prohibitive transaction costs relative to
the baseline case is similar—two or three percent—in the two supply scenarios.
Multiple qualities.
One limitation of the previous analysis is that we have not allowed a plausible
supply-side response: if used cars are not available, manufacturers have an incen-
tive to provide lower-quality new cars. We can extend the model to allow for this
possibility by assuming that there is a competitive (i.e., infinitely elastic) supply
of lower-quality cars. Specifically, in the Appendix we report in detail on the case
in which manufacturers supply new cars of two qualities: a car of quality q0 (i.e.,
the same car supplied in the benchmark case) and a car of quality equal to q5
(i.e., a car whose quality equals a five-year old car of the benchmark case). We
set the price of the car of quality q5 to its price in the benchmark case: $7, 465.
Thus, the price is well below that of any new car in the U.S. market.
This counterfactual delivers four main results. First, the output of the high-
quality new good falls as households with intermediate preferences substitute
towards the cheaper, low-quality good. However, total new car output rises sig-
nificantly relative to the case of a single new car. Second, the aggregate welfare
loss from prohibitive transaction costs are even smaller than in the case with a
single new car, since households have an additional margin of adjustment. Third,
the distribution of the welfare losses are qualitatively similar to those displayed
in Figure 2 for the case of a single quality of new cars: consumers at the bottom
of the distribution suffer the most, because low-quality new goods are still too
expensive for these consumers relative to very old used goods. Fourth, households
in the middle of the preference distribution now suffer smaller losses, because the
low-quality new goods allow them to obtain qualities that are closer to their target
qualities of the benchmark case.
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Overall, this counterfactual suggests that a richer expansion of the set of new
goods implies a reduction of the aggregate welfare losses relative to the case of a
single new car, especially for middle-preference households.
B. Scrappage Policies
In this section, we investigate how scrappage policies affect equilibrium allo-
cations and welfare. This analysis can be useful in understanding the effects of
policies that have been implemented in some countries. For example, Japan has
a thorough inspection registration system (called Shaken), with strict emission
standards that induce households to scrap their cars earlier than households in
other countries do (Clerides, 2008).
We consider the following policy: All cars are scrapped when they reach the (ap-
proximate) scrappage age that keeps the total stock of cars equal to the stock in
the counterfactual with prohibitive transaction costs examined in Section IV.A—
i.e., T = 15 in the case of inelastic supply and T = 13 in the case of elastic
supply. However, two substantive differences arise between these two counterfac-
tuals. First, the level of transaction costs is different. Specifically, we consider
the effects of the scrappage policy with the same level of transaction costs as
in the baseline case (i.e., 15 percent of p1, increasing to approximately 50 per-
cent of p10; see Section III.B). Therefore, secondary markets are active in the
case of a scrappage policy. Second, households’ scrappage decisions are hetero-
geneous when transaction costs are prohibitive, with higher-valuation households
scrapping their cars earlier than lower-valuation households. However, this het-
erogeneity does not arise under the policy studied in this section since all cars
have positive net resale values, and, thus, no households scrap them before they
reach T . As in previous analyses, we evaluate steady-state allocations and wel-
fare. Hence, our analysis complements the evaluation of temporary scrappage
subsidies that affect the intertemporal incentives to scrap cars, generating a one-
off change in the cross-sectional distribution of car vintages (Adda and Cooper,
2000; Copeland and Kahn, 2013; Miravete and Moral, 2011). These papers study
models that do not allow for active secondary markets.
Table 6 reports the effects of these counterfactual scrappage policies on alloca-
tions and welfare in the two scenarios of elastic and inelastic supply, respectively.
Overall, as in previous counterfactual analyses, the quantitative effects are similar
in these two supply scenarios.
Quantity of Cars.
Table 6 reports that, when the new-car supply is elastic, new-car output in-
creases by 22 percent relative to the baseline case. However, relative to the base-
line case, the total stock of cars decreases by 16 percent, as the new-car increase
does not compensate for the decrease in the scrappage age. When the new-car
supply is inelastic, the total stock of cars decreases by 23 percent relative to the
baseline case.
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Table 6—: Allocative and Welfare Effects of Scrappage Policies
Baseline
Elastic
Supply
Inelastic
Supply
New Cars
New Cars, Baseline Case
1 1.22 1
Price of a New Car
Price of a New Car, Baseline Case
1 1 1.47
Households with at least one car
Households that acquired a car in the last 12 months
3.21 4.01 4.90
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
5.08 6.23 7.51
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
3.27 1.85 1.74
Correlation(Log(Non-Durables), Age of Young Car) −0.23 −0.21 −0.21
Households with no cars 0.13 0.25 0.30
Households with one car 0.35 0.33 0.32
Households with two cars 0.52 0.42 0.38
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
1 0.99 0.95
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
1 0.76 0.63
Median
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
1 0.92 0.79
Welfare
Welfare, Baseline case
1 0.99 0.98
Note: This table reports statistics on car allocations computed from the equilibrium of the model with
a policy that imposes scrappage of all cars older than 14 years of age in the case of inelastic supply
and 13 years of age in the case of elastic supply. Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
and
Median
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
are computed using only households with cars in the
baseline case.
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Figure 3. : The figure displays counterfactual car prices relative to baseline car
prices when new-car supply is elastic (dashed line) and inelastic (solid line).
Prices.
Figure 3 displays the effect of the scrappage policy on car prices relative to the
prices in the baseline case. The dashed line refers to elastic supply and the solid
line to inelastic supply. Two contrasting effects are at work. First, the scrappage
policy reduces the total stock of cars, thereby raising the valuation of marginal
buyers of all vintages and, thus, increasing prices. Second, the scrappage policy
decreases cars’ “lifetime,” thereby decreasing the resale value of cars—of older
vintages, in particular—and, thus, their prices. Figure 3 shows that the first
effect quantitatively dominates. Interestingly, intermediate vintages experience
the highest increase in prices relative to the baseline case. Intuitively, these are
the vintages that have more substitutes since they are in the middle of the vertical
distribution of qualities. Thus, the scarcity of cars relative to the benchmark case
increases the prices of these vintages relatively more. Finally, prices of older
vintages drop rapidly. This is again intuitive since the scrappage policy reduces
the useful lifespan of cars.
Trade.
In both supply scenarios, since cars last fewer years, primary markets become
more important, and the volume of trade in secondary markets relative to primary
markets is lower than in the baseline case. Overall, the number of transactions
in used goods is now slightly lower than the number of transactions in new goods
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in both supply scenarios.
Household Car Holdings.
Table 6 shows that the smaller stock of cars, due to the shorter lifespan of
cars, increases the fraction of people without cars relative to the baseline case.
All of this reduction in the stock of cars comes at the expense of the fraction
of households with two cars. The reason is that households’ willingness to pay
for their second car αθ is, on average, low since α is low. Since the scrappage
policy eliminates older cars and increases the prices of younger cars, second cars
are too expensive relative to households’ willingness to pay for them. Moreover,
this effect is even stronger when the new-car supply is inelastic since, as Figure
3 showed, prices increase more in that case. Thus, the decrease in the fraction of
households with two cars is larger when the new-car supply is inelastic.
Furthermore, these scrappage policies decrease the absolute value of the cor-
relation between the log of households’ non-durable consumption and the age of
their youngest car, as reported in the sixth row of Table 6. The magnitude of
this decrease is smaller than that reported in Table 5, suggesting that scrappage
policies have a smaller effect than prohibitive transaction costs on the sorting
between cars and households.
Welfare.
Figure 4 displays the ratio between consumer surplus with the scrappage policy
and consumer surplus in the baseline case for households that acquire a car in the
baseline case, ranked by the percentile of their valuation θ, for the two scenarios
of elastic and inelastic supply. The figure confirms that households at the bottom
of the valuation distribution suffer the largest surplus decrease relative to the
baseline case because the lower stock of cars implies that these households do
not own a car. The average and median percentage surplus losses equal 24 to 37
percent and 8 to 21 percent of the baseline surplus, respectively, depending on
the elasticity of the new-car supply. However, Table 6 reports that the magnitude
of the aggregate effects on consumer surplus is substantially smaller: either one
or five percent, depending on the elasticity of the new-car supply, corresponding
to $246 or $1,230 per year for households with cars in the baseline case. The
reason for the small aggregate loss relative to the large loss for many households
displayed in Figure 4 is that the highest-valuation households suffer the smallest
losses, and they have the largest weight in the aggregate consumer surplus.
Table 6 further shows that these scrappage policies generate a redistribution of
welfare from consumers to producers when supply is inelastic, consistent with the
finding in Table 5. Consumer surplus is lower with this scrappage policy because
transaction costs are infinite for the oldest vintages. In contrast, producers’ profits
increase since new-car prices increase. The overall effect of the policy is to decrease
welfare, although, again, the quantitative effect is only between one and two
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Figure 4. : The figure displays counterfactual consumer surplus with the scrappage
policy relative to baseline consumer surplus by percentile of valuation θ, elastic
new-car supply (dashed line) and inelastic new-car supply (solid line). Consumer
surplus is calculated as the average value function before purchasing any car:∫ 1
0 Vθ,α (T + 1, T + 1) dG (α).
percent, depending on the elasticity of the new-car supply.24
Two contrasting effects help explain the difference in welfare between the scrap-
page policies, reported in Table 6, and the case of prohibitive transaction costs,
reported in Table 5. First, secondary markets are active in the case of the scrap-
page policy, but not when transactions costs are prohibitive, thereby allowing
households to sell their depreciated cars at positive net prices. This effect leads
to higher welfare in the case of the scrappage policy relative to the case of pro-
hibitive transaction costs. Second, households can choose when to scrap their cars
when transaction costs are prohibitive, but not with the scrappage policy, thereby
allowing households to keep cars older than T. This effect leads to higher welfare
in the case of prohibitive transaction costs relative to the case of the scrappage
policy. Overall, a comparison between Tables 5 and 6 indicates that the first ef-
fect quantitatively dominates. The reason is that the first effect allows for a finer
matching of relatively young vintages to high-valuation consumers, whereas the
second effect allows for finer control of relatively low-quality cars for low-valuation
consumers. The first effect dominates because of supermodularity: More value is
created at the top than is lost at the bottom.
24The positive effect of the scrappage policy on profits may not be a general feature of the model. Be-
cause durability is exogenous, a reduction in durability, as in the scrappage policy, could hurt producers.
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Table 7—: Non-Durable Consumption, U.S. vs. France
United States France
Mean(Non-Durable Consumption) 16111.05 15079.37
St. Dev.(Non-Durable Consumption) 11826.26 9916.07
Note: Values are in U.S. dollars. French prices are converted into U.S. dollars using the average exchange
rate during the year 2000: 1 U.S. Dollar = 1.085 Euro.
V. The Effect of Heterogeneity: A Comparison with France
As we highlight throughout our analysis, gains from trade in secondary markets
for many durable goods arise from heterogeneous valuations for quality. In our
quantitative analysis, a key input into a household’s valuation for quality θ is
non-durable consumption. In this section, we calibrate our model using France’s
distribution of non-durable consumption to investigate the quantitative perfor-
mance of the model on data from a different country. This analysis also allows us
to examine how preference heterogeneity affects the allocative role of secondary
markets and used-car prices.
To this end, we use the 2000-2001 Enqueˆte Budget des Familles, a cross-
sectional survey of 10,305 French households that is similar to the U.S. Consumer
Expenditure Survey. Most notably, it reports households’ income and consump-
tion for different categories of goods. We aggregate goods to construct households’
non-durable consumption following as closely as possible the aggregation we per-
formed on the U.S. CEX. Moreover, the Budget des Familles reports the number
of vehicles that each household uses at the time of the interview, and, for up
to two vehicles per household, it reports information about each vehicle, such as
whether it was acquired in the previous 12 months and whether it was acquired
new or used.
Table 7 reports the mean and the standard deviation of non-durable consump-
tion in the United States and in France, showing that heterogeneity is lower in
France than in the U.S. The French distribution of non-durable consumption is
very well approximated by a lognormal distribution with parameters µFR = 9.42
and σFR = 0.64. Moreover, Table 8 reports some aggregate statistics on French
households’ car holdings calculated from the Budget des Familles. The first row
reports that, on average, only one out of every 4.5 households acquired a car in
France within the last year (the ratio is equal to three in the U.S.; see Table
1). The second row reports that one out of every six cars was traded during the
year 2000 (one out of every 4.5 cars in the U.S.). The third row reports that,
of all cars traded, approximately one in three cars was new (one in four in the
U.S.). Overall, these aggregate statistics show that secondary markets for cars
are substantially less active in France than in the U.S., indicating that our model
linking the dispersion of preferences with the volume of trade is qualitatively con-
sistent with these cross-market differences. The last three rows of Table 8 report
the distribution of cars per household, documenting another important difference
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Table 8—: Secondary Markets: Model vs. Data, France
Data Model
Households with at least one car
Households that acquired a car in the last 12 months
4.39 3.79
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
5.82 5.21
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
2.98 3.19
Correlation(log(Non-Durables), Age of Young Car) −0.27 −0.35
Households with no cars 0.17 0.15
Households with one car 0.48 0.53
Households with two cars 0.35 0.32
Note: This table reports the moments of the data computed from the 2000-2001 Budget des Familles
that the model seeks to match and the corresponding moments computed from the model; see text for
more details.
with the U.S.: The average number of cars per household is 19-percent higher in
the U.S. than in France.
In keeping with the spirit of the quantitative exercise, we perform a “con-
strained” calibration of the model for France. In particular, we use French-specific
parameters governing households’ preferences over cars, the total stock of cars,
and cars’ holding costs, whereas we keep the characteristics of cars—i.e., deprecia-
tion and exogenous scrappage—the same as those that we used in the calibration
for the U.S.. More precisely, we let the product distribution of the valuation
θ = yǫ be given by the lognormal distribution of French households’ non-durable
consumption y (parametrized as described above) and by a lognormal distribu-
tion of the unobserved heterogeneity ǫ. This unobservable heterogeneity captures
some of the preference-based differences between the U.S. and France that we do
not explicitly model. Of course, there are potentially other differences between
the U.S. and French car market. However, we believe that it is useful to inves-
tigate how far our fairly parsimonious model can go in matching the data. As
for the U.S. calibration, we impose µǫ = 0 and we calibrate the parameter σǫ by
matching the correlation between the log of households’ non-durable consump-
tion and the age of their youngest car, yielding σǫ = 0.87. We further allow the
distribution G of α to be a Beta distribution with parameters specific to France.
We choose these parameters to match the French aggregate statistics of the first
column. The calibrated value of the mean of α equals .16 and the standard devi-
ation of α equals 0. This implies that the dispersion of the preference parameters
ǫ and α are lower in France than in the U.S.. Moreover, we allow the holding
costs c to be specific to France and the calibrated value of c is 1,884 dollars.25
25Since the distribution of q, the exogenous scrappage parameter γ and the scrappage age T are the
same in the U.S. and French calibration, we need the holding cost c to be country-specific to equate the
total stock of cars to the total demand of cars. The Budget des Familles reports that the annual average
household expenditure on maintenance, insurance and gasoline equals $1,708 per car. This is higher than
in the U.S., as we find in the calibrations.
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Figure 5. : The figure displays car prices in the U.S. (dashed line) and in France
(solid line). Prices are in U.S. dollars. French prices are converted into U.S.
dollars using the average exchange rate during the year 2000: 1 U.S. Dollar =
1.085 Euro.
The second column of Table 8 reports the results of the calibration. Table
8 confirms that our model is a quantitative success despite the constraint on
the calibration. More specifically, it shows that the valuation distribution allows
the model to match the volume of trade in secondary markets in France fairly
well, along with the correlation between households’ non-durable consumption
and the vintage of their youngest car. Moreover, allowing for a country-specific
distribution of α allows the model to match the distribution of car holdings well.26
The model also generates interesting general-equilibrium patterns on the rel-
ative decline of car prices between the two countries; Figure 5 displays them.
New-car prices are higher in the U.S. than in France, as they are in the data:
the calibration delivers a new-car price in France approximately 10-percent lower
than that in the U.S.27 However, the model-generated prices decline at a faster
rate in the U.S. than in France. Thus, old-car prices (i.e., cars older than 4 years)
are higher in France than in the U.S. The intuition for these patterns is that
France’s less-dispersed preference distribution flattens the depreciation of prices,
as the willingness to pay for a marginally better car is lower when the preference
26The match between the model and the data becomes almost perfect if we allow the quality distri-
bution q to be specific to France (i.e., with q0 = 0.69 and δ = 0.015).
27Thus, our model provides a potential explanation for cross-country difference in car prices, as re-
ported by Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001, 2005).
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distribution is less dispersed.
VI. Conclusions
Secondary markets play a potentially important role in determining the set of
durable goods available to consumers and how different households with heteroge-
neous preferences benefit from such goods. We set up a model to understand the
allocative and welfare effects of secondary markets. Our analysis highlights that
durable goods offer many different margins of adjustments to consumers: which
vintage to buy, how long to keep it, whether to sell it or scrap it. These many
margins of adjustments imply that any change in secondary markets—because of
changes in transaction costs over time or because of policies that directly affect
them, such as scrappage policies—has potentially large effects on the volume of
trade and allocations, but smaller effects on consumers’ surplus and welfare.
There are several possible interesting extensions of our analysis. First, it would
be useful to allow for endogenous durability. This would have very little effect
in the counterfactual of eliminating transaction costs because the endogenous
scrappage age is very similar to that in the baseline case. However, the effects
could be substantial in the counterfactuals with prohibitive transaction costs and
with the scrappage policy because the scrappage age in these counterfactuals is
significantly lower than that in the baseline case. This would give manufacturers
an incentive to reduce their investments in durability so that cars would depre-
ciate faster. Calculating the welfare consequences of accounting for endogenous
durability requires a measure of the cost savings that come from such a reduction
in durability. However, even without such a measure, we can conclude that the
change in durability will be beneficial in the case of perfectly elastic supply be-
cause the cost savings will be passed along to consumers; this allows the industry
to adjust by better tailoring the design of the goods to the needs of consumers.
Moreover, there will be a larger output response in these counterfactuals because
the reduced durability will lower the cost of production. Second, it would be
useful to understand in more detail the effects of variety of cars in the primary
market. This would potentially improve our understanding of the effect of sec-
ondary markets on the primary market. Finally, we believe that an extension
of our framework may be useful in studying the effects of alternative emissions
policies: if the emissions of new vehicles are decreasing over time, durability af-
fects aggregate emissions. One could study the relative impact of a policy that
accelerates the technological improvement in emissions compared to a policy that
encourages scrappage of old, more highly polluting, vehicles.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we report in more detail on the counterfactual case with
multiple qualities of new cars that we mention in Section IV.A. Specifically, we
assume that manufacturers supply competitively new cars of two qualities: a car of
quality q0 (i.e., the same car supplied in the benchmark case) and a car of quality
equal to q5 (i.e., a car whose quality equals a five-year old car of the benchmark
case). The prices of these cars are equal to their prices in the benchmark case:
the high-quality car price is $21, 487, and the low-quality car price is $7, 465 (note
that this price is significantly below that of any new car in the U.S. market).
Table A1 reports the quantitative results of this counterfactual case with pro-
hibitive transaction costs and an infinitely elastic supply of new cars of two qual-
ities. The top rows of the table indicate that the output of the high-quality
new good falls, whereas the cheaper, low-quality good captures approximately
45 percent of total new-car sales, as households with intermediate preferences
substitute towards it. Overall, total new car output rises by 53 percent relative
to the baseline case, and by 25 percent relative to the analogous counterfactual
with a single new car (Table 5). The bottom rows of the table confirm that the
aggregate welfare losses from prohibitive transaction costs are small. They are
even smaller than in the case with a single new car, since the low-quality new
car provide households with an additional margin of adjustment. Figure A1 dis-
plays the ratio between consumer surplus with prohibitive transaction costs and
consumer surplus in the baseline case for all households that acquire a car in the
baseline case, ranked by the percentile of their valuation θ, for this case of elas-
tic supply of two new cars. The figure shows that households with intermediate
preferences suffer very small losses, because the lower-quality new goods allow
these households to obtain qualities that are closer to their target qualities of
the benchmark case. However, households at the bottom of the distribution still
suffer large welfare losses, because low-quality new goods are still too expensive
for these consumers relative to very old used goods.
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Table A1—: Allocative and Welfare Effects of Secondary Markets, Prohibitive
Transaction Costs, Elastic Supply of New Cars of Two Qualities
Two Qualities
of New Cars
New Cars of Quality q0
New Cars, Baseline Case
0.83
New Cars of Quality q5
Cars of Quality q5, Baseline Case
0.78
Total New Cars
New Cars, Baseline Case
1.53
HHs with at least one car
HHs that acquired a car in the last 12 months
6.24
Total stock of cars
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
10.11
Cars acquired in the last 12 months
New Cars acquired in the last 12 months
1
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline
0.99
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline
)
0.86
Median
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline
)
0.98
Welfare
Welfare, Baseline case
0.99
Note: This table reports statistics on allocations and welfare computed from the model with
prohibitive transaction costs (i.e., λa = 1) and elastic supply of new cars of two qualities.
Mean
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
andMedian
(
Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus, Baseline case
)
are
computed using only households with cars in the baseline case.
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Figure A1. : The figure displays counterfactual consumer surplus with prohibitive transaction costs
relative to baseline consumer surplus by percentile of valuation θ, elastic supply of new cars of two
qualities. Consumer surplus is calculated as the average value function before purchasing any car:∫
1
0
Vθ,α (T + 1, T + 1) dG (α).
